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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTH EAST FURNITURE and 





UTAH and DEAN L. BARRETT, 
Def end ants-Res pu nde n ts. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
This matter arises out of a claim by the defendant, 
Dean L. Barrett, requesting additional compensation 
benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 
Utah. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COlVIlVIISSION 
The Industrial Commission ruled that the Appli. 
cant was entitled to workmen's compensation benefits 
notwithstanding the fact that the applicant had settled 
his case for $6,250.00 with his automobile insurance 
carrier. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff, State Insurance Fund, seeks a re-
versal of the Industrial Commission's ruling that de-
fendant, Dean L. Barrett, is entitled to both workmen's 
compensation benefits and the proceeds received from 
an "uninsured motorist coverage" provision of his auto-
mobile liability insurance. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Dean L. Barrett, filed on January 
24, 1968 an application for benefits under the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act (R. 8). He alleged in 
said application and at the time of the hearing on this 
matter that on November 10, 1966 while being employ-
ed by the plaintiff South East Furniture Company, he 
was involved in an automobile accident during the 
course of his employment. The plaintiff, The State In-
surance Fund, was the carrier for Mr. Barrett's em-
ployer and in connt:ction with his accident had paid 
2 
1111 J1cal expenses and temporary disability benefits \ R. 
Jo). The plaintiff, The State Insurance .Fund, denied 
fmthcr liability for the reason that the defendant, Dean 
L. Barrett, had collected proceeds from his automobile 
liability carrier, State Farm Automobile Insur-
ance Company, in the amount of $6,250.00 ( R. 96). 
Pursuant to said denial a hearing was held before 
the Industrial Commission on April 10, 1968. At the 
hearing the defendant, Barrett, testified that he 
sustained a whiplash type of injury when his automo-
bile was struck by an automobile driven by one Albert 
Kindred. It appears from the record that .Mr. Kindred 
was at fault and that Mr. Barrett claimed proceeds 
under his liability policy with State Farm l\Iutual 
Automobile Insurance Company. This policy was made 
part of this record ( R. 89). The policy had an "unin-
sured automobile coverage" provision. Said provision 
provides in part as follows: 
"COVERAGE CT-Damages for Bodily In-
jury Caused by Uninsured Automobiles. To pay 
all sums which the insured or his legal represen-
tative shall be legally entitled to recover as dam-
ages from the owner or operator of an uninsured 
automobile because of bodily injury sustained by 
the insured, caused by accident and arising out 
of the ownership, maintenance or use of such 
uninsured automobile; ... " 
At the time of the accident in question Mr. Bar-
rett was driving his own vehicle. The liability insur-
ance on his vehicle was purchased and the premium was 
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paid by :Mr. Barrett .. Mr. Barrett's employer, the South 
East Furniture Company, required him to have liability 
coverage for his automobile (R. 41). :Mr. Barrett was 
paid on a piece-work basis and was reimbursed by his 
employer for the use of his automobile on a mileage basis 
(R. 45). 
Subsequent to the time that Mr. B:1.rrett claimed 
and received benefits from the State Insurance Fund 
he, with his attorney, negotiated with the State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and entered 
into a document entitled "Release and Trust Agree-
ment'' (R. 96). Said agreement is attached hereto and 
1s marked Exhibit A of Appendix 1. 
Mr. Barrett received compensation benefits pur-
suant to the provisions of 35-1-62 U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended.1 This statute provides that if compensation is 
1 35-1-62. "Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of thir1l 
parties--Remedies of employee-Rights of employer or insur-
ance carrier in cause of action-Maintenance of action-Dis-
bursement of proceeds of recovery- When any injury or death 
for which compensation is payable under this title shall have been 
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another person not in 
the same employment, the injured employee, or in case of 
death his dependents, may claim compensation and the injured 
employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have 
an action for damages against such third person. If compensation 
is claimed and the employer or insurance carrier becomes obli-
gated to pay compensation, the employer or insurance carrier 
shall become trustee of the cause of action against the third 
party and may bring and maintain the action either in its own 
name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or 
the personal representative of the deceased, provided the em-
ployer or carrier may not settle and release the cause of action 
without the consent of the commission. 
"If any recovery is obtained against such third person it 
shall be disbursed as follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attor-
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paid based upon an accident which was caused bv the 
wrongful act or neglect of another person, that em-
ployee may claim compensation and may also claim 
damages against '"such third persons". The statute also 
provides that if compensation is claimed and paid, as 
in this case, the insurance carrier becomes the trustee 
of the cause of action against such "third party" and 
may act either in its own name or in the name of the 
employee. The statute further provides that any bal-
ance over and beyond the amount of compensation 
which had been paid should be "applied to reduce or 
satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing against 
the person liable for compensation" ( 35-1-62 ( 3) ) after 
the carrier or employer is compensated in full. 
Mr. Barrett received a recovery and executed the 
document entitled "Release and Trust Agreement" 
without advising the plaintiffs and after receiving these 
proceeds makes claim for additional compensation. 
The State Insurance Fund urged upon the Indus-
trial Commission that it was entitled to reimbursement 
for sums expended and that it would have no additional 
liability for compensation until the claim of the appli-
cant would exceed the sum of $6,250.00 pursuant to the 
provisions of 35-1-62, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. The 
neys' fees, shall be paid and charged proportionately against the 
parties as their interests may appear. 
(2) The person liable for nmpensation payments shall be 
reimbursed in full for all payments made. 
(3) The balance shall be paid the injured ?r 
his heirs in case of death, to be apphed to reduce or m 
full any obligation thereaftn accruing against the person hablr, 
for compensation." 
5 
Industrial Commission held that l\!Ir. Barrett was en-
titled to both Workmen's Compensation benefits and 
the proceeds received by him pursuant to his uninsured 








The initial issue that needs to be determined is 
whether or not the proceeds received pursuant to an un-
insured motorist clause is to be considered recovery 
against a "third person" within the meaning of 35-1-62, 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended. An "uninsured motorist" 
provision is a relatively new type of coverage that is 
included within liability policies to protect drivers from 
being injured by irresponsible persons unable to answer 
in damages for their negligent acts on the highway. 
Section 41-12-21.l sets forth the mandatory re-
quirement (effective July l, 1967) that all automobile 
liability policies must contain uninsured coverages. The 
argument cannot be made, therefore, that one who has 
uninsured coverage has voluntarily, at his own instance, 
obtained a different type of coverage than other driv-
ers on highways. The compulsory re-
quirement'. all policies;'fncludel an uninsured motor-
6 
ist clause is to protect innocent parties from the finan-
cial inability of an ''uninsured motorist". This general 
principle is articulated at 70 ALR 2d page 1252 in 
an annotation entitled "Rights and Liabilities 
'Uninsured l\ilotorist' Coverage". This annotation in 
its introduction states as follows: 
§1. Scope and related matters. 
"This anuotation deals with cases which have 
discussed 'uninsured motorists coverage,' a new 
type of automobile insurance which came into 
being as the result of public concern over the 
increasingly important problems arising from 
injuries inflicted by negligent motorists who are 
uninsured and financially irresponsible. 
"Designed to further close the gaps inherent 
in motor vehicle financial responsibility and com-
pulsory insurance legislation, this insurance cov-
erage is intended, within fixed limits, to provide 
financial recompense to innocent persons who 
receive injuries, and the dependents of those who 
are killed, through the wrongful conduct of 
motorists who, because they are uninsured and 
not financially responsible, cannot be made to 
respond in damages." 
The question to be determined, therefore, is wheth-
er or not recovery, pursuant to an uninsured motorist 
claim is to be considered recovery against the third 
party tort-feasor or whether or not recovery should be 
considered as recovery pursuant to a personal contract 
of insurance. Or, stated differently, is recovery under 
an uninsured motorist claim to be considered recovery 
against "third persons" within the meaning of 35-1-62. 
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In a recent Oregon case, Peterson v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 238 Ore. 106, 
393 P. 2d 651, the Oregon court initially discussed the 
reason and the effect of uninsured motorist clauses. The 
court stated as follows: 
" [ 1] The basic purpose of the uninsured mo-
torist provision seems clear. It provides protec-
tion for the automobile insurance policyholder 
against the risk of inadequate compensation for 
injuries or death caused by the negligence of 
financially irresponsible motorists. See Note, 2 
\Vill. L.J. 56, 61 (1962); Commissioners of the 
State Insurance Fund v. 1\-Iiller, 4 A. D. 2d 481, 
166 N.Y.S. 2d 777, 779 (1st Dept. 1957). In 
other words, the legislative purpose in creating 
compulsory uninsured motorist coverage was to 
place the injured policyholder in the same posi-
tion he would have been in if the tortfeasor had 
had liability insurance." 
The question presented in this case was whether 
or not the Insurance Commissioner of Oregon had auth-
ority to approve proYisions in the uninsured motorist 
section of a policy reducing the liability of the carrier 
by the amount paid to a person in the form of \Vork-
men 's Compensation Benefits. 
The court stated in part as follows: 
"In all of the decisions mentioned, the de-
fendant, seeking to take advantage of the plain-
tiff's receipt of benefits from some other source, 
has been a tort-feasor; but here, the defendant 
is a contracting party, not a tort-feasor. This 
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difj'erencc, lwu:cver, is not material in the sense 
that the basic legislative purpose in requiri11q 
uninsured nwtorist insurance is to place the 
jured parflJ in the same position u;ould have 
been if the t.urt-fcasur had hod lia/Jility insur-
ance. (Emphasis added). 
The Oregon Court, therefore, has properly con-
strued an uninsured motorist clause to have the same 
effect as recovery from the defendant tort-feasor. \Yhen 
a claim is presented to an insurance company under an 
uninsured motorist clause, the insurance carrier negoti-
ates with the insured in the same manner as it would if 
it was representing the third party tort-feasor. This 
anomaly is brought about by the provisions of the policy 
which provided the is liable "to pay all sums 
which the insured ... shall be legally entitled to re-
cover as damages". The Oregon Court's decision, 
therefore, is realistic and has properly characterized the 
effect of an uninsured motorist policy. To argue differ-
ently would be engaging in a legal fiction which is not 
supported by logic or practical analysis. 
Subsequent to the accident, the State Farm .Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, for all practical pur-
poses, was negotiating with, and effectuated a settle-
ment as if it represented the third party tort-feasor, one 
Alfred Kindred. It is respectfully urged that recovery 
in the form of settlement or otherwise, based upon an 
uninsured motorist clause should be considered a recoY-
ery against "a third person" within the meaning of 3.5-
1-62, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
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There is authority that both compensation and 
workmen's compensation benefits may be received. See 
Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v. Miller, 4 
App. Div. 2d 481, 166 N.Y. Supp. 2d 777; Horne v. 
Superior Life Insurance Company, 203 Va. 282, 123 
S .E. 2d 40 l ( 1962) • 
It is submitted, however, that a better reasoned 
decision in Jones v. 1lf orri.wn, U.S. D. Ct., Ark. 284 F. 
Supp. 1016 ( 1968). In this case the court examined the 
Arkansas statute in regard to third party liability. This 
statute is similar in import to 35-1-62. The Arkansas 
statute, 81-1340, provides as foIIows: 
"Third party liability.-( a) Liability unaf-
fected. 
( l ) The making of a claim for compensa-
tion against any employer or carrier for the 
injury or death of an employee shaU not affect 
the right of the employee, or his dependents, to 
make claim or maintain an action in court 
against any third party for such injury, but the 
employer or his carrier shaU be entitled to rea-
sonable notice and opportunity to join in such 
action. If they, or either of them, join in such 
action they shaII be entitled to a first lien upon 
two-thirds [2-3} of the net proceeds recovered 
in such action that remain after the payment 
of the reasonable costs of coUection, for the pay-
ment to them of the amount paid and to be paid 
by them as compensation to the injured em-
ployee or his dependents. 
" ( 2) The commencement of an action by an 
employee or his dependents against a third party 
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by reason of an inJury, tu wluch 
this 81-1301-81-1349} is applicable, or 
the adJustment of any such claim shall not af-
fect the rights of the injured employee or his 
dependents to recover compensation, but any 
ai:nount by the injured employee or 
dependents irom a third party shall be ap-
plied as follows: Reasonable costs of collection 
shall be deducted; then one-third [1-3} of the 
shall, in every case, belong to the 
lilJUred employee or his dependents, as the case 
may be; the remainder, or so much thereof as is 
necessary to discharge the actual amount of the 
liability of the employer and the carrier; and 
any excess shall belong to the injured employee 
or his dependents." 
The general mtent of the ...:\rkansas statute is, of 
course, the same as our statute in regard to third party 
actions. It should be noted, however, that the statute 
is somewhat more stringent in that the employee must 
give notice to his employer or insurance carrier in order 
to afford them an opportunity to join in the action. 
The issue presented to the court was whether or not 
settlement against an insurance carrier would be con-
sidered settlement against "a third person". The court 
specifically faced this issue and held that recoyery 
against the insurance carrier would be considered a re-
covery both againsl auy .. third party." The court recog-
nized the holding i11 llurnc i'. Su11criur Life ln:mrancc 
Company, supra, :i11d uf Stoic ln.rnr-
mve F1111rl 1·. "'Jfiller .,11pr11. :1ml 
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"In Horne it was held that recovery by the 
injured party against the uninsured motorist 
carrier was not a recovery against 'any other 
party.' In other words, this recovery is not 
equivalent to a recovery against a third party 
tortfeasor. This part of the opinion is in con-
flict with the applicable provisions of the Work-
men' s Compensation Act. Any recovery by the 
injured party, regardless of whom from, is in 
the nature of compensation for the injuries. 
The 'workmen's compensation' is designed to 
protect employees against work-connected ac-
cidents resulting from any cause, including em-
ployers' negligence, the employee's own negli-
gence, and acts of God. Also protected agaiQSt 
is negligence of third parties. However, in this 
event the compensation carrier is given the right 
to recover its expenses from the third party. 
When the injury is the result of acts of the 
employer, the employee or God, there is no one 
to whom the compensation carrier may look for 
reimbursement. This is the risk which forms the 
basis for the compensation insurance premiums. 
This is not the case when the negligence of 
third parties enters the picture. Were it other-
wise, the injured employee would be entitled to 
collect his workmen's compensation benefits and 
then seek recovery against a third-party tort-
f easor, with the possibility of something in the 
nature of a 'double recovery.' To provide such 
is not the purpose of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. When an injured party recovers 
on account of his injuries, regardless of from 
which third party, he has been compensated 
and, having already paid, the compensation car-
rier is entitled to reimbursement to the extent 
provided in the Act. Ark.State.Ann. § 81-1340 
(supra).'' 
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It is submitted, therefore, that the nub of the mat-
ter is whether or not when a person is injured within the 
scope of his employment, he is entitled to double re-
covery. It is submitted that compensation benefits is 
a unique type of insurance, whose purpose is to afford 
quick and speedy help to the workmen when injured. It 
is submitted that double recovery in these circumstances 
is not appropriate. In examining the philosophy of the 
uninsured motorist clause and particularly the fact that 
said clause is now a mandatory provision in all litbil-
ity policies, the employee should not be allowed to col-
lect twice. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMlHISSION ER-
RED IN ALLOWING WORKMEN'S COl\1-
PENSATION BENEFITS IN LIGHT OF THE 
RELEASE AND TRUST AGREEMENT. 
As mentioned earlier herein, the defendant, Dean 
L. Barrett, and his attorney, after workmen's compen-
sation benefits had been paid, negotiated with the in-
surance carrier and received recovery in the amount of 
$6,250.00. Mr. Barrett entered into a form contract 
which was entitled "Release and Trust Agreement," 
which is attached hereto marked Exhibit A of Appendix 
1. Said agreement assigned to the liability insurance car-
rier any rights he, Barrett, may ha,·e against the 
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third party tort-feasor, one Albert h.mdred. It is the 
position of the plaintiffs herein that this act, for all prac-
tical purposes, negates the plai11tiff, the State Insurance 
.Fund, the right it has to pursue its action pursuant to 
35-l-62, C.C.A. Hl53, as amended. 
35-1-62 has gone through many legislative changes. 
Initially, the employee had the right to elect to proceed 
against a third party, or receive compensation. Subse-
quent thereto if an injured employee was desirous of 
claiming compensation, he was required to assign his 
claim against the "third party" to the carrier. In 1945 
the legislature amended 35-1-62 to its present form. 
The statute, it is submitted, carefully provides that 
there is but one claim that can be brought against a 
third person. The employer may commence the action 
and claim compensation, but if recovery is had, "the 
person liable for compensation benefits shall be reim-
bursed in full for all payments made" and the balance 
should be paid to reduce or satisfy any additional com-
pensation obligation. The statute also provides that if 
compensation is paid, the employer becomes a trustee 
nf the cause of action and may bring an action against a 
third person, either in its own name or in the name of 
the injured employee. The statute allows, therefore, the 
ultimate wrongdoer to be answerable for the damage 
that he causes. 
It appears clear that the legislature never intend-
ed that there be two causes of action against the wrong-
doer. It is clear also that if the employee commences the 
14 
action and prosecutes the same successfully, that the 
carrier must be compensated in full. If the carrier 
commences the action, he does so in a trust relationship 
and is reimbursed in full. It is submitted, therefore, 
that the giving by l\Ir. Barrett an assignment of his 
right to proceed against the third party tort-feasor to his 
liability carrier, that he has effectively negated the 
plaintiffs right to full reimbursement. 
Certainly, the Release and Trust Agreement re-
ceived by State Farm :Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company vests with them the claim that Barrett 
may have against Albert Kindred, the tort-feasor. Now 
the plaintiff, The State Insurance Fund, would not be 
allowed to sue the third party tort-feasor in its capacity 
as Trustee, pursuant to the provisions of 35-1-62, since 
the carrier knows the injured employee has assigned all 
right, title and interest to another entity. If action is 
commenced by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Company, said company has no duty to see that the 
plaintiff, The State Insurance Fund, be reimbursed in 
full, and if recovery is had against the third party tort-
feasor, by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, is the plaintiff still required to pay compen-
sation? 
The effect of this agreement entitled "Trust and 
Release Agreement" is simply that the defendant, )Ir. 
Barrett, is attempting to split a cause of action. It is 
submitted that 35-1-62 clearly does not allow for the 
splitting of a cause of action. It is clear also that split-
15 
ting of causes of action in Utah are not favored. The 
obvious reason being the multiplicity of claims and the 
protection of the potential defendant from successful 
law actions. 
In an early case, Badger v. Badger, 69 Utah 293, 
254 Pac. 784-, the court, in quoting from authorities, 
stated that a party having one claim cannot split the 
demand into separate causes of action. The court said: 
"'There are no maxims of the law more firmly 
established or of more value in the administration 
of justice than the two which are designed to 
prevent repeated litigation between the same 
parties in regard to the same subject of con-
troversy". 
This early announcement of not allowing a split-
ting of causes of action has been sustained in more rec-
ent cases. See Johnson v. Cudahy Packing Company, 
107 Utah 114, 152 P. 2d 98 ( 1944) and Cederloff v. 
rVhited, 110 Gtah 45, 169 P. 2d 777 ( 1946). 
It is submitted that the language in a recent Utah 
case is helpful in solving the problems presented here. 
111 Raymer v. Hi-Line Transport, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 
427. 394 P. 2d 383, the court clearly stated that one may 
not its causes of action even where insurance was 
involved. the Court stated: 
""Te are confronted with the long-established 
rule against 'splitting cause of action.' If neither 
nor Hi-Line had insurance coverage, 
Rnrmcr would have been foreclosed from insti-
16 
tuting two actions-one for his property damage 
and one for his personal injuries. Does the fact 
that was insurance coYerage gi,·e rise to 
an exception to the In the instant case we 
think not. ' 
"An annotation in 62 A.L.R.2d reports, com-
mencing at page 982: 
'In a substantial majority of jurisdictions, a 
single act causing simultaneous injury to the 
physical person and property of one indiYidual is 
held to give rise to only one cause of action, and 
not to separate causes based, on the one hand, 
on the personal injury, and on the other the prop-
erty loss. * * * 
'In jurisdictions supporting the single cause 
of action rule, the courts have most often taken 
the view that the rule accurately reflects the prin-
ciple that a cause of action inheres in the causa-
tive aspect of a breach of a legal duty-that is, 
the wrongful act itself-and not in the various 
forms of harm which flow therefrom. Recog-
nition of the existence of only one cause of action 
is said to benefit both plaintiffs (freeing them 
of delay and burdensome expense) and defend-
ants (relieving them of the injustice of being 
subjected to more than one suit for a single 
tort), and to be in harmony with public policy 
and the tendency toward simplicity and direct-
ness in the determination of contro,·ersial rights 
and the elimination of a multiplicity of suits. 
* * * 
'The argument that the single cauu of ac-
tion rule may tt·ork injustice in ca.ms where 
one of' the elcment.s of' damages is the suh;ect 
17 
of insurance has also been rejected.' ( empha-
sis added) 
"It seems logical that if an assured cannot 
split his cause of action, the insurer should not 
be in a better position." 
In the cases which have allowed double recO\·-
ery it was recognized that the insurance carrier's 
right of subrogation was not negated. In those cases 
subrogation rights were created and protected by a 
lien-type of statute. In both Commissioners of the State 
Insurance Fund v. 1l.liller, supra, and Horne v. Super-
ior Life Insurance Company, supra, it was clearly indi-
cated because of the statutory language of those partic-
ular states that the insurance carrier's subrogation 
rights were not abrogated (but see the recent New J er-
sey case of Feliciano t:. Oglesby, 102 N.J. Supp., 378, 
246 A. 2d 63, where the court held it would not allow an 
assignment of a cause of action pursuant to an uninsur-
ed motorist prm·ision to violate a New Jersey trust 
fund). It is submitted, however, that that is not the 
case in this instance, that the defendant-applicant has 
effectively negated the carrier's right to proceed against 
the ultimate wrongdoer while he, the applicant, receives 
double recoYery. If suit is brought against Kindred by 
either the plaintiff, the State Insurance Fund, or the 
liability carrier, State Farm Automobile Insur-
ance Company, there has been a splitting of a cause of 
action. There has been an aborting of the spirit and 
intent of 35-1-62 that allows the workman a speedy re-
coYery and a right against the ultimate wrongdoer. 
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If this procedure, which is urged by the def end-
ants in this case, was allowed, there would be a race to 
the courthouse since it would become clear that two en-
tities could not, and should not be able to proceed 
against a tort-f easor arising out of a single claim. 
It is the belief of the plaintiff, therefore, that once 
a settlement has been completed between the employee 
and a third party that no additional liability can be as-
signed to the workmen's compensation carrier. It is 
submitted that the note writer in the Utah Law Review, 
Volume No. 9, Number 4, Winter, 1965 at page 945 
clearly states what the law should be in these cases: 
"Under the general rule that an employer is 
entitled to be subrogated to his employee's claim 
against a third party to the extent of his com-
pensation liability, questions arise concerning 
the effect that a settlement between the third 
person and the employee should have upon the 
employer's subrogation rights. The employer's 
subrogation rights are protected in certain juris-
dictions where it has been held that settlement 
between an injured employee and a negligent 
third party operates as a bar to a later compen-
sation claim against the employer. States which 
have reached this result generally have statutes 
requiring the injured employee to. elect between 
receiving compensation or 
against the third In such 
settlement with the third party would be m lieu 
of the tort action, and a subsequent compensa-
tion claim would be barred because the claimant 
had exercised his statutory option in favor of 
proceeding against the third party. There may, 
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however, be some doubt concerning this result 
under statutes, such as Utah's, which permit 
both compensation and a third-party suit. Since 
an election of remedies is not required, it is argu-
able that it should make no difference whether 
compensation is demanded prior to or subsequent 
to an action against the third person. However, 
this argument should be examined in light of the 
fa.ct that part of (he reason for allowing third-
party suits at all is to permit the employer or 
the employer's insurance carrier to recoup what 
has been paid for compensation by being sub-
rogated to the employee's claim against the third 
person. Since a release or settlement would dis-
charge the third party's liability to the employee, 
it wcmld effectively deprive the employer or 
insurance carrier of his subrogation rights. 
Therefore, to maintain a position consonant with 
legislative intent and to protect the rights of 
employers, a settlement between an employee 
and a third person should preclude a subsequent 
compensation claim aga,inst the emploY'er in 
Utah." 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial 
Commission erred in allowing the defendant, Dean L. 
Barrett, to receive both 'V orkmen' s Compensation 
benefits and the proceeds from his uninsured motorist 
coverage. Further, it is submitted that the settlement 
entered into between l\'Ir. Barrett and his liability car-
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rier effectively negates the plaintiffs' right to subroga-
tion and, therefore, the plaintiffs are not liable for addi-
tional \Vorkmen's Compensation benefits. 
Respecfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. :MOORE, of 
RA\VLINGS, ROBERTS & 
BLACK 





STATE FA.R)l IXSCRANCE COl\IPANIES 
Bloomington, Illinois 
RELEASE AND TRCST 
Policyholder-DEAN L. HARRETT 
Claim N o.-44-221-330 
Policy N o.-4059 7 57 44 
Received of STATE FARl\I MUTUAL 
INSURANCE C 0 l\I PAN Y, 
hereinafter called the Company, the sum of Six 
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars and no/ 
100 ($6.250.00) in full settlement and final discharge 
of all claims under the above numbered policy because 
of bodily injuries known and unknown and which have 
resulted or may in the future develop, sustained by 
DEAN L. BARRE TT by reason of an accident or 
occurrence arising out of the ownership or operation 
of an uninsured automobile by ALBERT KINDRED 
which occurred on or about the 10th day of November, 
1966 at Tooele, Utah. 
For the consideration aforesaid, and to the exent 
of any payment made thereunder, the undersigned 
agrees to hold in trust for the benefit of the Company 
all rights of recovery which he shall have against any 
person or organization legally liable for such bodily 
injuries. and assigns to the Company the proceeds of 
any settlement with or judgment against such persons 
nr organization by specifically excepting any proceeds 
recoverable under the workmens compensation statutes 
of Ctah. 
The Company is hereby authorized to take any 
action which may be necessary either in law or in equity 
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m the name of the undersigned against any such person 
or organization, and the undersigned covenants and 
agrees to cooperate fully with the Company in the pre-
sentation of such claims and to furnish all papers and 
documents necessary in such proceedings and to attend 
court and testify if the Company deems such to be 
necessary. 
The undersigned further warrants that he has 
made no settlement with, given any release to or prose-
cuted any claim to judgment against any person or 
organization legaUy liable for such bodily injuries, 
and that no such settlement will be made, no such release 
will be given and no such claim will be prosecuted to 
judgment without the written consent of the Company. 
IN WITNESS 'VHEREOF, I have hereunto 
set my hand and seal this 22nd day of November, 1967. 
Signed DEAN L. BARRETT 
127 No. 8th E., Bountiful, Utah 
Witness 
Judy R. Summerhays 
Notary & Witness 
Sandy, Utah 
This will certify that this document is a copy of the 
original in Mr. Barrett's file. 
Felix E. Jones 
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